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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SECURITY LEASING COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

FLINCO, INC., a corporation,
Defendant, Respondent and
Third Party Complainant,

Case
No.
11627

vs.

OFFICE EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATES,
a corporation, and JOHN B. JOHNSON
Third Party Defendants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff seeks to require defendant to pay rental
on equipment after defendant had cancelled the lease
on the equipment for lack of performance and
plaintiff's failure to get it programmed to do the
defendant's work.
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT
District Court entered judgment of no cause of
action on plaintiff's complaint and no cause of action
1

on defendant's cross-complaint and counterclaim ,
against plaintiff and third party defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment and seeks a
determination that it is entitled to the balance of
its lease payments. Neither third party defendant '
nor defendant appeals. Defendant seeks an affirm.
ance of the trial court's decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant cannot agree to the Statement of Facts
as set forth in the brief of the plaintiff.
This case was tried by Honorable Frank Wilkins,
evidence was taken, a full and complete trial had,
argument before the cou1·t made, and the judgment
is based on the evidence received by the court.
Plaintiff's claim against defendant is based on a
series of documents that are exhibits. The documents
are Exhibit P-1 entitled Master Lease Agreement,
Lease of Personal Property, dated April 26, 1965;
Master Lease Agreement, Schedule A, Exhibit P-2,
dated July 29, 1965; Master Lease
Schedule A, Exhibit P-3, dated March 22, 1966;
Lessee's Statement and Completion Certificate, Exhibit P-4, dated August 2, 1965.
The documents covered two items of equipment.
One item is a CTS-8 Friden Computyper, S5165865,
2

and the second item of equipment is a Tab Card
Punch Control Unit, TCPC 30-873. The Computyper
was a used item of equipment which Security Leasing Company owned prior to the 26th of April, 1965.
This is the item of equipment that Exhibit P-1 and P-2
relate to.
John B. Johnson, third party defendant, delivered
the equipment described in the exhibit and presented
the documents that relate to the Computyper to the
defendant for its signature. He signed both of the
documents. In Exhibit P-1 he signed as manufacturer's representative witness, and in Exhibit P-2
he signed simply as witness. No one else signed for
plaintiff.
On Exhibit P-4, which relates to the installation of
the Computyper, Johnson again signed as witness and
indicated on the Completion Certificate that Office
Equipment Associates, the other third party defendant, was the vendor of the Computyper.
The three documents relating to the Computyper
are forms which plaintiff, Security Leasing Company,
uses and were furnished by said company. The forms
do not accurately describe the transaction that was
entered into between plaintiff and Flinco. It was
defendant's position throughout the trial that these
documents do not constitute an integration, having
within their four corners the understanding of the
parties.
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The following discrepancies are undisputed:
C1) Exhibit P-1, Paragraph 10, recites:
"Lesse_e J:as selected the prol?erty to be leased
and it is ordered by Secunty Leasing Com.
pany for this lessee and at lessee's entire discretion and risk. Lessor will not be resp 0115 _
ible for any repairs, worn out and/ or replace.
ment parts or defects in the equipment."
The undisputed fact is, (a) Security Leasing was the
owner of the equipment prior to its installation at
Flin co' s place of business, ( b) it agreed to maintain
the equipment for one year, ( c) it agreed to program
the equipment, ( d) Flin co never saw the equipment
until delivery by Johnson, and ( e) the equipment was
never ordered by Security Leasing for Flinco.
Exhibit D-7 shows the agreement by Security
Leasing and payment to Office Equipment Associates
of $1,975.00 for the maintenance, programming and
commission on the lease of its Computyper to Flinco.
It is undisputed that John B. Johnson undertook
to do the programming for Security Leasing Com·
pany, and it is further undisputed that the programming was to be done in stages. John B. Johnson also
undertook to do the maintenance work on the Computyper for the year shown in Exhibit D-7. It is also
undisputed that John B. Johnson was not a manufacturer's representative, that Office Equipment Associates was not the vendor of the equipment, that at
4

;ill times he was arranging a lease of plaintiff's equipn1cnt vYith Flinco, Inc. and was paid for these services,
including the programming and maintenance by
Security Leasing Company.
Programming as used in this case involves the
\Yiring of the Computyper and adjusting the electronic panel in the Computyper so that it would produce the records which Flinco, Inc. needed to conduct
its business. The Computyper is a machine with the
ability to produce an invoice, to retain certain information off the invoice and give totals at the end of
a period of time of the mathematical information
which the machine has retained. It also prints, at the
time it prints the invoice, a tape. This tape is later
translated by other electronic equipment which produces a card for IBM computers.
Defendant's evidence supports the court's findings that the programming was never completed by
Johnson and that Johnson was not a trained programmer. Programming a Computyper is a very intricate,
difficult, complex operation CR. 161-167). There
is no one in the state of Utah who is qualified by the
Friden Company to program its Computypers CR.
159 l. 'V"hen Friden itself seeks such services, it must
import from Denver a trained programmer to wire
the electronic panel and control so that the machine
will produce the information that is programmed
in to it ( R. 15 9 ) .
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The evidence is undisputed that Johnson had
worked for Friden prior to his setting up his own
operation as Office Equipment Associates, but had
never been classified as a programmer. His testimony
was that on some occasions he has assisted in programming.
The Exhibits P-1, P-2 and P-4, which relate to
the Computyper, contain no mention of the duty of
plaintiff to program or maintain the Computyper.
Exhibit D-7, which shows that such a duty was undertaken by Security Leasing, is not a part of the documents which plaintiff claims contain the integrated
agreement between the parties.
Flinco was never satisfied with the programming
which was accomplished (R. 263-266-291). Third
party defendant undertook to maintain and keep repaired the equipment during the year after it was
installed at Flinco' s place of business. Flinco
not satisfied with the maintenance either CR. 26+265).
In the spring of 1966 the second piece of equipment was installed at Flinco's place of business. This
is the Tab Card Punch Control unit represented by
Exhibit P-3. This item of equipment was actually
purchased from the Friden Company and then leased
to Flinco. It is Flinco's evidence on which the court
relied that the TCPC equipment was required because
the Computyper would not function efficiently for
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Flinco. Erroneous data was punched by the Computyper onto the tape. This information was different
from the information which appeared on the typed
invoice prepared at the same time CR. 289). These
erorrs were not discoverable until after the tape had
been translated by other electronic equipment either
at Sentinel Security Life Insurance Company's place
of business or one of the other service bureaus used by
Flinco. The TCPC unit, it was thought, would produce the information placed on the tape immediately and then it could be checked to see whether or
not that information was the same as the information on the invoice. The TCPC was used for about
six months, but even with it, Flinco could not get
its work accomplished satisfactorily CR. 287-288-278279).

Defendant's primary complaint about the inadequacy of the program which third party defendant
placed in the machine was that it never did produce
any totals on which the defendant could rely CR. 257260 J. It would not retain the cash sales separate from
the charge sales and permit the company to know
what had been sold on credit and what had been sold
for cash. The cash register never could be balanced
at the close of the day's business. The machine also
was never programmed to record on the invoice all
the information which Flinco needed in the operation
of its business CR. 263). It was defendant's position
that the rental of the TCPC unit was only the result
7

of its continuing effort to get the Computyper to produce the records it needed. The notice of termination !
is dated December 2, 1966 (Exhibit P-5). Rent was
paid in full to the date of termination.
Plaintiff refused to consent to the termination
and brought the present action for the balance of the
payments under the lease.
Each issue was fully litigated. The court foun<l iu
favor of the plaintiff on the cross-complaint and
counterclaims of defendant and in favor of defendant
on the complaint of plaintiff, entering a judgment on
each of no cause of action. The evidence presented
supports the court's findings in every respect.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE WRITTEN
INSTRUMENTS ARE NOT ALL OF THE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN PARTIES.
POINT II
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE
COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS NOT
PERFORMED BY PLAINTIFF.
POINT III
DEFENDANT PAID IN FULL ALL RENT
DUE PRIOR TO CANCELLATION OF THE
LEASE.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE WRITTEN
INSTRUMENTS ARE NOT ALL OF THE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN PARTIES.
One of the basic issues presented by the parties
iu their pleadings and statements to the court was
vvhether or not there was an integration containing
all of the agreements between the plaintiff and
defendant. The court found that there was not an
integrated written agreement and that part of the
agreement was in writing, but a substantial amount
of the understanding between the parties was not in
writing.
TI1e agreements signed by both parties were on
forms which the plaintiff used in routine rental agreements. These forms applied to situations where a
renter selected the item of personal property and
Security Leasing would then purchase that property
and lease it back to the customer. The rental arrangement being one which would provide a method of
financing the purchase or rental of personal property.
This vvas not the situation with Flinco. The undisputed evidence revealed that Security Leasing
always owned the Computyper and that Office Equipment Associates and John B. Johnson were actually
acting as agents for Secw·ity Leasing in placing the
Computyper with Flinco. Flinco never did select
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the Computyper and have Security Leasing purchase
it for them, but actually rented a used item of equipment from Security Leasing.
The agreements do not describe such a transaction. The evidence undisputedly shows the ownership of the equipment and the manner in which it
was supplied to Flinco. On three material matters,
the written documents do not describe the true and
correct understanding. They are, (a) relationship of
parties, ( b) ownership of the leased equipment
(c) duty of plaintiff to program and maintain the
Computyper.
The written document, (Exhibit D-7), shows that
Security Leasing was to program the Computyper
into Flinco's business and maintain it for a year.
It might be argued that Flinco is responsible for
the fact that these documents do not accurately
described the understanding between the parties. If
Flinco is in some way at fault in this respect, how
much greater is the responsibility of the plaintiff,
Security Leasing, since the forms furnished and the
agreements that were prepared were its forms and
prepared by its agents and employees. If the principle to apply is that construction should resolve doubt
against preparer of instruments, Security must
suffer.
It seems clear that it is a factual question as to
whether or not the understanding between the parties
10

is contained in the written document or is partially
oral. On this question the undisputed evidence supports the court's finding that there was no integration. The agreement between the parties was partly
in writing and partly oral. (See Findings of Fact,
No. 2, Page 5 7).
The general rule seems to be that:
"Where suit is brought to compel a defendant
specifically to perform a written contract,
parol evidence may be given by him to show
that the alleged agreement is not the true
agreement." CJ ones on Evidence (5 Ed), Vol.
2, Sec. 469, P. 897.)
The law relating to parol evidence has been recently examined in this court in Rainford vs. Rytting,
........ Utah 2d ........ , 451 P2d 769. The guarantors of
a purchase contract sought to avoid its provisions by
showing conditions or oral agreements which were
at odds with the terms of the written contract. Such
evidence was inadmissible. This court also has recently decided Jones vs. Acme Building Products,
Inc., 22 Utah 2d 202, 450 P2d 743, in which it permitted parol evidence from one of the parties to explain what was intended by the words "net worth" in
a written instrument since such words are susceptible
to more than one meaning. It is an exception to parol
evidence that where there is a latent ambiguity in the
language of a written instrument, parol evidence may
be received to explain what the parties had in mind.
11

In the present case the written instruments do not
refer to the programming of the Computyper. This
necessary and essential part of the installation of the
Computyper is nowhere mentioned. Exhibit P-1, the
lease, is entirely silent. Plaintiff accepted the responsibility for programming the Computyper (See Exhibit D-7). It paid Office Equipment Associates to
program and maintain the Computyper.
As far as the progran1ming of the Computyper is
concerned, the written documents were incomplete.
This creates a latent ambiguity. The written documents are not integrated and are actually incomplete.
Paro! evidence would have to be received then to discover what the agreement relating to the programming of the Computyper was. This kind of latent
ambiguity and incompleteness of written instruments
has always been recognized as an exception to the
parol evidence rule. In Fox Film Corp. vs. Ogden
Theatre Company, Inc., 82 Utah 279, 17 P2d 294, the
court discussed at some length the parol evidence rule
and the exceptions thereto and stated, after reciting
the rule, at Page 282:
"There are numerous exceptions to this rule,
however, most of which pertain to informal
writings, incomplete memoranda, unilateral
documents and other writings that do not
purport to set forth the entire contract" * * *
12
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The court then continued and stated, Page 283:
"One well-recognized exception to the above
rule is that extrinsic evidence, parol or otherwise, is admissible to explain a latent ambiguity in a writing. This does not mean that
terms or conditions may be inserted into or
taken out of the writing by direct oral assertions, but it does mean that the court may
receive evidence of such surrounding facts as
will enable it to look upon the transaction
through the eyes of the parties thereto and
thereby know what they understood or in-tended the ambiguous word or provision to
mean. 4 Jones Commentary on Evidence
# 1544, etc."

r

I

I
I

As an example of what the court had in mind as
far as latent ambiguity is concerned, the court in
Fox Film Corp. vs. Ogden Theatre Company, Inc.,
supra, cited the early case of Boley vs. Butterfield, 57
Utah 262, 194 P. 128. In this case there was a lease
of summer grazing for sheep and in it no mention
was made of whether or not the lessee was to have
the exclusive use of the range for his sheep. As a
matter of fact, the lessor had also leased to another
sheep grazer. The first lessee refused to pay any
rent on the grazing right. Trial court, noting the
failure of the lease to state whether or not it was
exclusive, permitted the lessor to state that he had
advised the lessee prior to the lease that it was not
an exclusive lease.
The Boley vs. Butterfield principle applies exactly
to the present situation. There is no mention in any
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of the documents as to who is to program the Computyper and place in its electronic control panel the
various circuits that will make the machine produce
the records that Flinco needed. This omitted item
on which the written contracts are incomplete, had'
to be supplied to the court by parol evidence. The
parol evidence is without conflict. All of the evidence
demonstrated that this was a responsibility of plaintiff
and it actually paid third party defendant to do the
work of programming.
It is respectfully submitted that the court's finding
that there was no written integrated agreement is
supported by evidence. The written part was incomplete and contained a latent ambiguity. Under
such circumstances the court may ascertain what the
agreement between the parties was and then determine their rights.
POINT II
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE
COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS NOT
PERFORMED BY PLAINTIFF.
The court found that part of the agreement between the parties was that the Computyper would be
programmed, maintained and serviced for one year
at the expense of the plaintiff. (See Findings of Fact,
No. 3 Page 57). Court further found that the plaintiff
attempted to program the defendant's business. The
14

programming was to be conducted in stages, and only
a part of defendant's business was ever programmed
into the Computyper. (See Findings of Fact, No. 4,
Page 5 7). Court further found that the plaintiff and
third party defendants, who were plaintiff's agents,
never were able to program fully the business of
defendant into the Computyper machine so that it
would supply the business records needed by the
defendant. (Findings of Fact, No. 5, Page 5 7).
The three foregoing findings of the court were
supported by evidence supplied by the plaintiff and
the defendant. (See Statement of Facts for specific
reference to testimony) .
Defendant's evidence, m the form of testimony
from Mr. Mastelotto, Mrs. Anderson and Miss Khant,
was uncontradicted. Plaintiff made an attempt to
program the business over the period of time that the
Computyper was present. Finally, in an attempt
to obtain the records needed by defendant, the TCPC
was ordered. It was thought that with this machine
conYerting the taped information immediately to the
IBM card, that the errors which were turning up in
the material produced by the Computyper would
be quickly apparent. After six months of this system,
Flinco came to the conclusion that it could not make
the Computyper work. After sixteen months, the
programming had never been completed. All that
the Computyper was ever programmed for was the
accounts receivable and the invoicing of sales at
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Flinco's place of business.
the cash and credit sales
and neither the inventory
placed on the Computyper

It still had not produced
as separate, total items
nor the payroll had been'
( R. 266).

It is the defendant's position that no evidence was
ever supplied by plaintiff or by third party defendant
which could be the basis of a finding that the programming of defendant's business into the Computyper was completed. This was a material matter.
The very essence of the lease agrrement. The
breach was the basis on which the termination of the
lease was claimed by Flinco in its letter of December
2, 1966.
Defendant submits the termination was justified.
POINT III
DEFENDANT PAID IN FULL ALL RENT
DUE PRIOR TO CANCELLATION OF THE
LEASE.
Defendant paid the rent on the machines supplied
by the Security Leasing up through the date of
notice of termination December 2, 1966. Defendant
tried in every way to get satisfactory performance
from the Computyper. (See Statement of Facts for
record references). It ordered an additional piece of
equipment which would assist in translating the
Computyper information into the IBM card. It suffered for sixteen months with incomplete and inaccurate records.
16

Plaintiff claims that the failure to cancel earlier
than December 2, 1966 is laches on the defendant's
part. It is defendant's position that during this period
of time it was attempting to make such adjustments
and accommodations as would give the Computyper,
the plaintiff, and Mr. John B. Johnson of Office
Equipment Associates, a reasonable chance to perform under the lease agreement. In Hanson Silo
Company vs. Bennett, 254 Iowa 928, 119 NW 2d 764,
the court quoted 12 Am fur, Contracts, #447, P. 1029
as the rule: CP.767)
"The general rule is that the right to rescind
must be exercised within a reasonable time,
although there is authority to the effect that
the mere question of how much time a party
to a contract has permitted to lapse is not
necessarily determinative of the right to
rescind, the important consideration being
whether the period has been long enough to
result in prejudice to the other party."
It is undisputed that the machine could produce
the records if it were properly programmed and
operating in the manner that it was designed to
operate CR. 166).

Plaintiff could not be damaged by the defendant's
extended efforts to get the machine to operate
properly. It received its rent for the full period. It
did not stay its hand in reliance on defendant's conduct. Its agent Johnson knew at all times that the
programming was not complete. Corpus Juris Secun17

dum, Vol. 17 A, Section 531 Contracts, Page 1026
'
states as the general rule in re laches:
"As a general rule, where there are no contractual limitations, a party to an agreement
may bring an action at any time until the
action is barred by the statute of limitations
and mere delay or laches, short of the statu'.
tory period of limitations and not connected
with such facts as may amount to an estoppel
is not a bar to an action at law on the con'.
tract. However, where one seeking to enforce a contract has by his conduct and unreasonable delay brought about an undue
hardship which by his diligence could have
been avoided, relief will be denied."

,
:
'

,

The evidence supplied by defendant from the
witnesses James P. Rice and George S. Burnett, who
are local employees of the Friden Company, convinced the court that John B. Johnson, the agent of ,
plaintiff who was charged with the duty of programming the Computyper, did not have the necessary
training and experience to wire into the electronic
control panels the program which Flinco needed.
As explained by these expert witnesses, the pro!

gramming of a business into the Computyper requires
the removal from the Computyper of the program
it originally had operated on ( R. 162) . A secondhand
machine, such as the equipment supplied by Security
Leasing, has already been programmed (R. 161).
The problem of removal of the old program, that is
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disconnecting the electronic panel circuits and inserting a new program, is more complicated than the
inserting of a program into a new machine that has
not already been wired with a program (R. 171).
Mr. Johnson had been an employee of Friden prior
to setting up his own business in the name of Office
Equipment Associates and had worked as a sales
representative with the Friden Company. However,
he had never been trained or designated as a programmer of the Friden equipment (R. 153). His job
while at Friden, even when his testimony is taken
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, was that of
a sales representative who on occasion had assisted
in the programming of machines (R. 171-172). A
programmer is someone who has the highest degree
of technical skill, ability and training in the handling
of the Friden Computyper. It was undisputed by any
testimony that there is not in the state of Utah or
in the area serviced by the local Friden office, a person trained to program the Computyper that was supplied to Flinco. The closest trained, designated programmer for this kind of equipment is at Denver
m. 159).
Security Leasing obligated itself to program the
Computyper rented to Flinco. This is standard practice in the rental or sale of the equipment (R. 172).
The only person who attempted to accomplish the
programming is John B. Johnson, plaintiff's agent.
Plaintiff furnished no evidence whatsoever that it
19

ever attempted to get from the Friden Company 0
designated, qualified programmer to insert into the
Computyper the program necessary to produce for
Flinco its business information.
The court finding that the programming was
never fully accomplished is undisputed. That the·.
Computyper was never able to supply the business
records which defendant needed is also supported by
all the evidence.
It is respectfully submitted that findings of the i
court as set forth in this point were supported not I
only by a preponderance of the evidence, but by
undisputed and uncontradicted evidence and were
the only findings which would reasonably have been .
made under the state of the evidence as shown by •
this record.
I

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of
the trial court should be affirmed, that the defendant
should have its costs incurred.

Respectfully submitted this __________________________ day of

----- ------ --- ------- -- -- -- -- ------ -- -- -----, 1969.
DWIGHT L. KING
Attorney for Defendant Flinco, Inc.
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